In addressing those responsible for drafting the Resolution on Party History, Deng Xiaoping commented that the CCP's work in the 10 years prior to the Cultural Revolution "should be assessed as generally good; in the main, it proceeded along the right road." "We suffered setbacks and made mistakes during that period," he admitted, "but the achievements were the main thing. " Deng lauded the prestige of the Party at the time as well as the fine atmosphere and high spirits that pervaded society. In a reference that obviously included the GLF, he observed that "when we met with difficulties, we were able to get through them quite smoothly," thus amplifying the current view that the negative experiences of the Leap do not detract from the overall upbeat assessment of the decade before the CR (Deng Xiaoping, 1984: 288) .
This evaluation of the years 1957-1966 contrasts sharply with the judgment concerning the Cultural Revolution decade of 1966-1976, which is dubbed the "ten years of internal chaos" and has been subjected to a campaign of "thorough negation" (chedi fouding) that denies even the smallest virtue to that era.3 Great pains are taken to show that whatever economic progress may have occurred between 1966 and 1976 was in spite of the CR and should be attributed to such factors as return on earlier investments (especially in the energy sector) and the adherence to the correct line by the vast majority of cadres and masses who loyally remained on thejob despite the chaos around them (Li Chengrui, 1984: K7-8, 15). One Hongqi article has argued that a major reason for the economic progress (however slight) during the CR was that "Comrade Mao Zedong was able to absorb the lessons of the 'Great Leap Forward"' and that, despite his Leftist errors during "the ten years of turmoil, he was still comparatively careful in economic work" (Gao Zhiyu, 1981: 68).
The GLF and the CR are both regarded as examples of "comprehensive mistakes" (quanjuxing de cuowu) that affected all aspects of the Party's work. In this senise, they stand apart from "partial mistakes" (jubuxing de cuowu) such as the "rash advance" during collectivization and the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 that had much more limited impacts (Tao Kai, 1982: 141; Deng Liqun, 1982: 143). But even within this shared framework the GLF and the CR are distinguished in such a way as to suggest that the latter was a much graver type of "comprehensive mistake." As one commentary on Party history said, "Not only were the mistakes of these three years [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] corrected comparatively quickly, but the duration [of the Leap] was also not too long; therefore the errors of these three years are different from those of the 'cultural revolution'," which were much more protracted and resistant to correction. (Tao Kai, 1982: 141). Indeed, official post-Mao views of the CrLF make a great deal of the various installments of rectification of Leap policies and especially of Mao's role in leading the adjustments of late 1958-mid 1959 and the early 1960s when he is said to have put forth many important ideas on the objective laws of socialist economic development (Hongqi, 1981: 25) . In contrast, Mao is seen as holding firm to his erroneous views on class struggle until his last mortal breath, whereas the CR is said to have ended only with the forceful removal of the Gang of Four. Thus the GLF is viewed as a period in which the Party made drastic mistakes but ultimately was able to redeem itself through the established mechanisms of rectification and self-criticism; on the other hand, the CR could be remedied only through such irregular interventions as the death of the Chairman and the arrest of some the Party's highestranking leaders.
THE ORIGINS OF THE GREA T LEA P FOR WARD
The most common theme in post-Mao analyses of the origins of the GLF concerns the combination of inexperience and arrogance that is said to have characterized the leadership of the CCP as they embarked upon the task of formulating the Second Five-Year Plan in the mid-1950s. The cumulative effect of successive domestic triumphs such as the victory in the civil war, the rehabilitation of the economy, the completion of the socialist transformation of agriculture, industry, and commerce, and the routing of the "opposition" in the anti-Rightist campaign, along with what was perceived as a highly advantageous international situation, led the Party to become infected with an "incautious spirit" (Wu Qungan, 1981: 27). Believing that they could do no wrong, the Party leaders undertook to bring about a rapid and sustained leap in the pace of China's development by relying on the formula of commitment, consciousness, and mobilization that had, in many ways, brought them their earlier successes.
Speaking of the circumstances that gave rise to the Leftist errors of excessive targets, commandism, and boastfulness during the Leap, the Resolution on Party History explains that This was due to our lack of experience in socialist construction and inadequate understanding of the laws of economic development and the basic economic conditions in China.... More important, it was due to the fact that Comrade Mao Zedong and many leading comrades, both at the Center and in the localities, had become smug about their successes, were impatient for quick results, and overestimated the role of man's subjective will and efforts [Resolution, 1981: 28] . This line of argument contains a blunt admission of naivete about the complexities of economic planning and the relevance to modernization of earlier guerrilla and post-Liberation experiences. But it also implies-sometimes quite explicitly-that the CCP in the mid-1950s was trying to remold China amidst unprec-edented circumstances in which mistakes were inevitable; therefore, such reasoning suggests, the errors of the GLF should be regarded as "setbacks occurring in the process of our Party's probing socialism" (Shi Zhongqiang, 1981: 54) . Indeed, much effort is expended to argue that such "setbacks" were the product of a certain time and do not amount to a general indictment of socialism or the CCP. As Luo Gengmo (1981: 8), one of the economic planners involved in the Leap, observed, misadventures like the GLF were "only transitory and localized problems" that were ultimately corrected by the Party itself and must not be interpreted as "inherent roadblocks" or flaws in a planned economy.
Post-Mao analyses are clear and consistent in asserting that those who made mistakes in the Leap were motivated by ideological optimism and patriotic aspirations. Their errors are seen as a product of overexuberance, not malice. At the conclusion of a self-criticism for his part in the GLF, Bo Yibo reflected in 1981 that "the masses excused us for doing wrong things because our intentions were good" (Bo Yibo, 1981: K34; emphasis added).4 Frequent reference is made to qualities like the "high level of activism" and the "enthusiasm and initiative for socialism" that characterized the times, along with the admonition that such motives must be affirmed even though they were taken to extremes in the GLF (Tao Kai, 1982: 136; Resolution, 1981: 28; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1985: 323). One survey of changes in a single area of rural Sichuan from 1949 up to the early 1980s concludes a discussion of the 1958-1960 period by describing how a small backyard blast furnace from the mass steel campaign has been left in place as a "souvenir" and a "key protected historical relic" commemorating the "grievous experience" of the GLF and as a reminder to the people that they "must never again commit such follies"; yet the same article praises the "noble and heroic spirit of daring," as well as the "enthusiasm and creativeness" of the masses during the Leap. Although acknowledging that during the GLF many people in the area "indulged in the wildest fantasies, thus causing incalculable losses and waste," the report also comments that those were times when "people dared to think and dared to act and achieved a lot of marvelous results" (Mu Qing et al., 1982: 41).
The positive portrayal of the motives that led to the Leap seems to exonerate those responsible for the movement's errors. It also contrasts sharply with the thoroughly sinister intentions attributed to those held to blame for the excesses of the CR, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. While Mao's motive for initiating the CR is ascribed to his misguided "theses" about the nature of class struggle in socialist society-which is interpreted as a benign, if tragic mistake-Lin and the Gang are depicted as driven by the most selfish and destructive counterrevolutionary aims. The GLF was certainly among the "major failures in practice" attributed to the agrarian socialist ideology of the CCP.
By its emphasis on the rapid transformation of the relations of production in the 1 950s, the Chinese variant of agrarian socialism was alleged to have violated the essential principle of scientific socialism, which is that "after the proletariat has seized political power, the first central task is to concentrate all energy on raising the social forces of production and to develop them faster and to an even higher level than under capitalism" (Wang Zhongyi, 1980: 2). The fact that China's revolution took place in a poor, peasant society, rather than in a country with more advanced means of production and a well-developed proletariat as envisioned by Marx and Engels, should have dictated that development of the economy be regarded as an even more pressing task. But the social reality of the revolutionary movement propelled the vanguard party to adopt the viewpoint of its main source of support, the small-producer poor peasantry. In light of China's stage of development in the first half of the twentieth century, the revolution "could not be anything but a modern peasant war led by the Communist Party." Rather than being able to mold the situation in China to fit with the demands of scientific socialism, the CCP was itself remolded by the peasantry; the result was that the Party under Mao's leadership "rationaliz[ed] Marxism" and "pinned a narrow pragmatist and historical idealist tail on Once it had become the ideological captive of the peasantry, the CCP was led into a whole series of fateful mistakes. The Party leadership came to "worship the spontaneity of the peasant class" and perverted Marx's scientific analysis of the peasantry by equating the revolutionary potential of "the poor peasants in the countryside with [that] of the modern proletariat." This led to a wave of "egalitarian rubbish" in the socialist transformation as the Party gave vent to the "fanatical and utopian" demands of the rural masses for rapid and radical change. It also caused the CCP to forge an ill-conceived alliance with the peasantry and to abrogate the united front between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie, which should have been utilized to "control" the least progressive social class, the peasants. The policy of "allying with the peasants on a socialist basis to destroy capitalism" was, it is argued, "a metaphysical view" that violated any logical application of scientific Marxism to China. This subsequently caused "a premature revolution to wipe out capitalism" and the erroneous elimination of the "state capitalism stage" of development that China so desperately needed (Ying Xueli and Sun Hui, 1980: 23, 28, 22, 25). Agrarian socialism thus led the CCP to propel China along a course of nationalization and collectivization that was entirely inappropriate to its level of development in the 1950s and ultimately to pursue such fantastical schemes as the Great Leap Forward.
Those who rejected this thesis readily admitted serious deviations in the latter stages of collectivization and the GLF, but vehemently denied that these deviations reflected agrarian socialism or that they negated the basic success ("an historical miracle") of the socialist transformation (Hua Shi, 1981: 41). For these critics, the intra-Party disputes during the 1950s concerned only the "pace" of change and not "the fundamental guideline of the Party" that cooperativization was a necessary step for China to take at the time. They argue that the proponents of "gradual and steady development of agricultural cooperation were correct" and should not have been criticized; but it is also wrong to conclude "that those who were in favor of a rapid development [of cooperation] were advocating 'agrarian socialism"' (Xue Xin, 1982: 73). The agrarian socialist argument was also faulted for assuming that China in the early 1950s simply was not materially or ideologically prepared to begin the transition to socialism and should have instead engineered a stage of state capitalism. On the contrary, at the time of Liberation, modern industry was highly concentrated and the confiscation of bureaucratic capital allowed the new government "to get control of the national economic lifelines and enabled the state-owned economy to become the leading component of the entire economy." This, in turn, "formed the material preconditions for China's building socialism" (Zhou Yongchuang, 1981: 93-94).7
Far from being a retrogressive social force that has subverted the mission of the CCP, China's poor peasants were touted in the critique of agrarian socialism as "a progressive laboring class" and as "the most reliable allies of the proletariat" in all stages of the revolution (Xue Xin, 1982: 82; Hua Shi, 1981: 45). Other examples of true agrarian socialism (for instance, the Russian narodniks) were cited to show that the path of socialist transformation in China had nothing in common with such a perverse ideology. For example, whereas agrarian socialists seek to establish an economic system based on individual, small-scale, self-sufficient peasant ownership and romantically spurn any industrial or commercial development, the CCP, it was pointed out, had always rejected such utopianism and advocated collectivization, technological transformation, modernization, and firm proletarian leadership of the peasantry (Zhou Yongchuang, 1981: 93). The CCP has, indeed, been guilty of errors of absolute egalitarianism at times, but this should not be regarded as a reflection of agrarian socialism because it "was not aimed at turning the whole social economy into an individual economy marked by equality and uniformity." Rather, the egalitarianism of the CCP was "subjectively aimed at consolidating the collective economy, though objectively it had a harmful and destructive effect on the collective economy" (Shi Zhongquan, 198 la: 12).
The official evaluation of the GLF is rather circumspect in discussing the movement's ideological origins. But there are traces of the agrarian socialism thesis in commentaries from people who must be regarded as carrying some political weight within the Party leadership. For instance, in a major address to the National Party School expressing his views on the necessity for a thorough critique of CCP history, Liao Gailong (1981 a: Part I, 84) observed that the mistakes of the Leap showed that "in the minds of the Party leaders, there was a rather systematic Leftist fantasy of socialism, which may also be called the peasant communism of absolute egalitarianism. This communism or socialism . . . was not scientific. It was a daydream [that] represented the peasants' prejudices based on egalitarianism." Liao's estimate aside, the CCP certainly summoned a lot of media muscle to rebuff the agrarian socialism argument. The Party even singled out for criticism in a Central Committee document the academic article that first offered the agrarian socialism thesis (Chengming jihpao, 1981).8 This response was a reflection of the Party's effort to shore up its prestige and the legitimacy of socialism. This, in turn, was necessitated by the acknowledged crisis of confidence unleashed in the wake of the dramatic, multifaceted changes that followed Mao's death and the CCP's often graphic condemnation of wrongdoing within its own ranks during the 20 years between 1957 and 1976. The agrarian socialism analysis of the Leftist errors of the 1950s obviously raised certain questions that were too thorny and challenged certain cows that were too sacred for the leadership's liking. It is one thing to admit error; it is quite another to impugn the guiding ideology and the class basis of the Party. In the agrarian socialism thesis, the mistakes of collectivization and the GLF were seen as a natural and inevitable outgrowth of a movement condemned to ideological deviance by its own social roots in the peasantry. In contrast, the sanctioned evaluation of the socialist transformation maintains that the ultra-Leftism that led the CCP astray in the mid-1950s was only a late-blooming trend within an otherwise healthy Party.9
MISTAKES AND CONSEQUENCES
In many ways, the litany of errors now attributed to the Great Leap Forward varies little from the critique of the movement that emerged during the mid-course adjustment from late 1958 through mid-1959 and again during the final retreat from the Leap in the first years of the 1960s. Post-Mao discussions of the GLF frequently contain the standard list of ultra-Leftist deviations committed at the time: "excessive targets, the issuing of arbitrary directions, boastfulness, and stirring up of a 'communist wind"' (Resolution, 1981: 28).10 The "communist wind" (gongchanfeng) refers to various policies that aimed to achieve a "premature transition to communism"; these policies included the free-supply system, the "leveling" of rich and poor units to achieve greater equality, transformation of ownership and accounting systems to embody a higher level of socialization of the means of production and methods of distribution, and zealous restriction of private economic activity.
In ideological terms, the mistakes of the GLF are traced to the Leftist error of "subjectivism" on the part of the leadership. 11 Although their subjective motives may have been good, Party leaders fell into the trap of letting their own revolutionary aspirations overwhelm their appreciation of the material and ideological constraints on what was possible to achieve at that point in time. As a result, there was no careful investigation or experimentation, and the Leap "was frivolously launched by relying only on political ardor and subjective wishes" (Zhonggong Jiangxishengwei dangxiao dangshi jiaoyanshi, 1983: 335). Commenting on why he went along with the inflated grain production targets for 1959, Luo Gengmo has confessed that "I myself was fascinated by this beautiful picture [of] our country's future, which I realize now represents nothing but wishful thinking" (Luo Gengmo, 1981: 7) . This subjectivism was compounded by the error of voluntarism, the belief that human will and energy, properly mobilized, can overcome any objective impediments to revolutionary change and economic development. There was undue reliance on "human sea tactics" and a neglect of science and technology; this, in turn, created a situation where expertise was denigrated and "the masses were running this and the masses were running that," which led to disasters like the backyard steel campaign (Luo Gengmo, 1981: 10; Deng Liqun, 1982: 143).
The GLF is also critically scrutinized for Leftist mistakes in economic management. The setting of unrealistically high targets, especially in grain and steel, is perhaps the most frequently cited planning error of the Leap. Political pressures and ideological extremism led to a vicious cycle between exaggerated output claims and projected production. The result was that "such false figures made people even more hot-headed" and economic planning came to be treated like a "'fairy tale' (shenhua) rather than as a science"(Sun Yefang, 1981: L5; Wu Qungan, 1981: 28). One concrete form of the high target syndrome of the GLF was setting output quotas according to unrealistic international standards as exemplified in the effort to outpace British and American steel production within a few years. As one recent analysis of the Leap put it: "If the goal to surpass Britain in 15 years [as set in 1957] had been carried out in a down-to-earth manner, it would have been possible to complete." But the planners got carried away with "making a good show" and said that China could "surpass Britain in three years and the United States in ten, and then enter communism ahead of schedule." Even when it was clear that the 1960 steel target could not be fulfilled, they persisted in trying to make "competition steel" (zhengqigang) simply to keep pace with the timetable for catching up with the West. The result was a complete disregard of quality and efficiency because the production of steel had become a "political question" rather than an economic one (Wu Qungan, 1981: 29).
Faulty handling of decentralization in industrial management has also been pinpointed as one of the major economic policy errors of the Leap. It is not so much the devolution of economic decision making itself that caused difficulties, but the way in which local power was "inappropriately expanded." The "downward release" of the GLF did not work because it took "the form of a political movement" without careful thought and gradual implementation. Things might have turned out differently, it is now asserted, if the localities had been given more power "in planning, in capital construction, and in the handling of finance, natural resources, and labor power" (Zhao Tiehe et al., 1983: 33). Criticism of such haphazard decentralization is meant to stand in juxtaposition to the much more thorough and systematic deconcentration of economic power that has taken place in recent years.
The Great Leap is also blamed for causing serious economic imbalances that continued to grow throughout the Cultural Revolution and were corrected only after the Third Plenum of December 1978. The nodal imbalance was that between heavy industry, on the one hand, and light industry and agriculture on the other; this problem is sometimes referred to as the imbalance between "the two types of social production," that is, the reproduction or expansion of the means of production versus production of goods intended for consumption (Liu Guoguang and Wang Xianming, 1980: 24). The major error here was the enforcement of the policy of taking "steel as the key link" (yigang weigang) in the development of the national economy. This led to a neglect of light industry, which by 1960 accounted for only 33% of total industrial output, compared to 55% in 1957 (Wu Qungan, 1981: 34). The bias toward steel and heavy industry in general likewise precluded increasing state investment in agriculture; the rural sector was also severely damaged by a host of other policies designed to subordinate agriculture to the drive for rapid industrial growth. These policies included the instruction to "take grain as the key link" (yiliang weigang) that was promoted in order to enhance local self-reliance in the absence of outside investment and to ensure the supply of basic foodstuffs to the recently swollen urban work force. This was combined with the In sum, by pushing targets that created serious distortions in the economy, the GLF is viewed as having laid the foundations of its own demise. Rather than living up to the promise of "one horse taking the lead, ten thousand horses galloping ahead" (yima dangxian, wanma benteng), the policy of "steel as the key link" is now said to have led to a situation in which "ten thousand horses stood mute" (wanma qixin), that is, the entire economy was brought to a virtual standstill (Wu Qungan, 1981: 34).
There has been a difference of opinion within the Party leadership as to whether artificially intensified class struggle was one of the major mistakes of the Leap or whether that particular Leftist error only seriously affected work after 1962. Liao Gailong has observed that the work of the GLF, continuing a trend begun in the anti-Rightist campaign, "was coercively promoted through airing of views and debates on the part of the masses, a method which enlarged the scope of class struggle" (Liao Gailong, 1981 a: Part I, 83). According to Liao, the critical error that ultimately gave rise to the GLF and then the CR was the reversal of the assessment of the 8th Party Congress that the main contradiction in China was no longer class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie but had shifted to the conflict between the relatively advanced relations of production and the absolutely backward state of the forces of production. This reversal on the issue of class struggle in socialist society began at the 2nd Plenum The basic lesson to be learned from the Leap is that "changes in the relations of production must accord with the situation in productivity" (Wang Menggui, 1981: 64). The commune movement, the implementation of egalitarian distribution schemes in both industry and agriculture, and the curtailing of private plots and rural markets are considered among the radical policies that were introduced during the GLF with the intention of boosting production, but had the contrary effect of undermining productivity by severely dampening individual labor incentives. The Third Plenum of December 1978 set in motion a process of reform that corrected "two decades of detours" and recognized the facts that socialism must be "rooted in reality" and that the socialist system "will wither away if there are attempts to help it grow by pulling it up artificially" (Yan Ling, 1982: 117).
The policy implications of this lesson are that China must have flexible strategies and tactics for modernization and not try to make its development fit into a "rigid pattern" dictated by a dogmatic definition of what constitutes socialism. Rather the task now "is to create those specific forms of the relations of production that correspond to the needs of the growing productive forces and facilitate their continued advance" (Yan Ling, 1982: 117-118; Resolution, 1981: 78). In other words, the logic of the Leap has been turned on its head: Instead of letting radical social change pave the way for economic growth, the development of production should now basically determine what sorts of changes are necessary and appropriate in such spheres as management, ownership, and distribution.
Another category of lessons to be drawn from the experiences of 1958-1961 involve the mistakes made in economic planning that reflected the Leap's "impatient effort to develop the productive forces" (Liu Guogang and Wang Xianming, 1980: 21). Obviously, one lesson is to avoid the same specific decisions about targets, rates of accumulation and consumption, the balance of sectoral investment, and so on that led to the disaster. More broadly, three basic principles form the core of the economic message to be learned from the Leap.
First, "economic construction must comply with objective law." Subjectivism like that giving rise to the Leap must not be allowed to override hard-nosed assessments to what is feasible in terms of certain universal rules of economic development and China's specific circumstances. Second, "the growth of the economy must be stable" (Wang Menggui, 1981: 64, 65). Objective economic laws set definite limits on the pace of development; although it still may be possible to achieve rapid and sustained growth-indeed, the word "leap" is even still used on occasion (for example, Shijie jingji daobao, 1984)-the "blind pursuit of speed [while] ignoring economic results" will only be counterproductive in the long run (Xie Minggan, 1983: 85). Third, improvements in the standard of living of the people must be the basis for judging the success or failure of any economic policy.'5 The GLF and the CR are considered unmitigated disasters in this regard and current efforts to link productivity and remuneration more directly, as well as to adjust the investment balance between heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture are seen as steps towards remedying the negative consequences of ultra-Leftism on the material well-being of the Chinese people.
The official view of whether the guiding principle of the GLF, the General Line for Socialist Construction, has lost all relevance for the current period has gone through a process of evolution over the past few years. The legitimacy of the General Line persisted even beyond the Third Plenum as symbolized by Ye Jianying's invocation of its central phrase in his speech commemorating the PRC's 30th anniversary in October 1979. "The task now facing us," Ye intoned, "is to ... bring into play all positive factors so that we can work with one heart and one mind and go all out, aim higher, and achieve better, faster, and more economical results in building a modern, powerful socialist country" (Ye Jianying, 1979: 22; emphasis added). The presentation of the General Line was modified in 1980 to delete such "incitant phrases as 'going all out' and 'aiming high,"' while adding "planned" and "proportionate" to give the formulation a more scientific basis (Liao Gailong, 198 la: Part III, 82-83). 16 The 1981 Resolution on Party History declared that the General Line was "correct" at the time it was promulgated because "it reflected the masses' pressing demand for a change in the economic and cultural backwardness of our country" even though it "overlooked objective economic law" (Resolution, 1981: 28). One commentary characterized the Resolution's approach to evaluating the General Line as a good example of applying "one divides into two" in that it included both positive and negative assessments; but it added that "the weak points and problems [of the General Line] are perhaps the basic aspect." Saying that the Line lauded revolutionary spirit, but neglected scientific attitude in promoting socialist development, the commentary noted the disastrous consequences of the GLF and said, "We must draw a lesson from this." Although some comrades were still spouting the General Line as a principle to be applied to Chinese commentators have themselves shown concern that ambitious but not unrealistic national objectives like quadrupling agricultural and industrial output by the year 2000 may fall victim to the Great Leap-like tendency of "some comrades" to seek maximum short-term growth rates rather than steady and balanced increases that take into account the constraints imposed by China's "short supply of energy, means of transportation and communications, and raw materials." To ignore such realities would repeat the errors of the GLF and only lead to "inferior quality, appalling waste, and poor results" that undermine any benefits derived from "temporary high speed" economic growth (Yu Youhai, 1985: K5-6). Finally, vestiges of the Leap can be detected in the muted, but nonetheless continued reliance on the campaign method of problem-solving and policy implementation. Such techniques may still work well for killing rats,17 but when applied to complicated situations like family planning that bring state and individual interests into conflict, they may easily lead to the same cycles of coercion and resistance, inflated targets, and deceitful reporting that characterized the "communist wind" of the Great Leap Forward (Wasserstrom, 1984) .
The official view of the Great Leap Forward offered by the current Chinese leadership is caught in a contradiction. On the one hand, there are many ways in which that view reflects an honest spirit of self-criticism. There is often a disarming willingness to acknowledge that the Party made a series of major blunders beginning in the mid-1950s due to inexperience, arrogance, complacency, and organizational ineptitude. Recent reforms also demonstrate that much has been learned from the GLF and that many of those now in power are determined to avoid committing similar mistakes.
On the other hand, there are elements of rationalization and face-saving in the prevailing line on the Great Leap. The tendency to remind the public of the "good intentions" of those who perpetrated the movement, the effort to deny that the failures like the GLF reflect shortcomings of socialism, and the general avoidance of detailed descriptions of the most drastic consequences of the economic collapse of 1959-1960 all add up to a certain defensiveness about the period. This defensiveness is particularly noticeable when the critique of the GLF is compared with that of the Cultural Revolution. As pointed out at the outset of this article, although the negative effects of the GLF were, by many measures, far worse than those of the CR, the latter is analyzed much more harshly than the former. Why this discrepancy?
The 16. The new formulation reads: "achieve greater, better, faster, and more economical results by a planned and proportionate development of the national economy" (Liao Gailong, 1981 a: Part III, 82). Xinhua (1985) , for a report that Chinese peasants killed 526 million rats in 1984 after a "drive to eliminate rats was touched off by a circular from the State Council."
See
18. Liao Gailong has gone on record (1981 b) as calling for extensive political reforms, including checks and balances, separation of powers, and decentralization; see also Moody (1984) .
